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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR)
Colonel B. R. Brown, USA(ACSI)
Captain H. W. McElwain, USN (ONI)
Colonel R. M. Lawson, USAF(AFCIN 2B3)
Colonel K. T. Gould, USA (J-2, The Joint Staff)
Colonel R. P. Halloran, USAF, Director of
Operational Services, NSA
Mr. Randolph V. Zander, Defense (OSO)

SUBJECT: NIE 10-61: AUTHORITY AND CONTROL IN THE
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

1. The attached terms of reference are forwarded for review.
2. It is requested that your representatives meet with us at 1000, Friday, 3 February, in Room 115 Administration Building to discuss these terms.

Chester L. Cooper
CHESTER L. COOPER
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

30 January 1961

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 10-61: AUTHORITY AND CONTROL
IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

THE PROBLEM

To assess the political structure of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the world system of Communist parties, to identify trends in the degree of Soviet control, and to estimate the future implication of these trends for world communism.

SCOPE NOTE

The paper will focus on the nature of relations among Communist parties, within and outside the Bloc, especially in the light of Sino-Soviet differences of the last year or more, and the recent Moscow conference. The first section will be a brief historical introduction, describing how Stalin exercised control over the movement, and developments since 1953 which have altered his system. The second will study the factors currently affecting the structure of

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authority in the movement. The third will analyze the implications of these for problems of coordination, for participation in policy formulation, and for effects upon the flexibility of Soviet policy. The fourth will estimate how these trends might develop in the future and what implications they might have for the West.

We suggest an Annex containing case studies of one or more non-Bloc parties as illustrative of the general problems facing such parties, e.g., Sino-Soviet rivalry and corresponding factions within a party, conflicts of interest between nationalism and internationalism, difficulties of making revolutionary progress against a non-Communist government which is simultaneously being courted by the USSR.

NOTE: Contributions are required for all but the first of these sections. Contributors should respond, not only at a general level, but with respect to major groupings in the Communist system, e.g., within the Bloc -- China, the Asian Satellites, Eastern Europe, and outside the Bloc -- the Communist Parties of Western Europe and North America, Japan, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- I. MAJOR FACTORS BEARING ON THE OPERATION OF AUTHORITY AND INFLUENCE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
 - A. Discuss ideology, special national problems, historical ties with the USSR or China, geographical proximity to the USSR or China, area influences (e.g., Castroism), the Yugoslav example.
 - B. What means does Moscow have to enforce its authority, e.g., prestige; persuasion; political, military, or economic leverage?
 - C. What means does China have to exert influence in the Communist movement?
 - D. To what extent do Moscow and Peiping compete for control over other parties? To what extent are Sino-Soviet differences reflected in factionalism within other parties? Discuss the significance of recent Albanian behavior.

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II. HOW HAS BLOC POLICY BEEN AFFECTED BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS?

- A. To what degree has there been a strengthening of a decline in Moscow's authority in setting general Bloc policy, or its flexibility in executing policy?
- B. What is the role of non-Soviet parties in formulating general Bloc policy? Policy on problems of specific interest to particular parties?
- C. To what extent has national interest shown itself to be a factor modifying the formulation of common external policies?
- D. In what instances has poor coordination or outright disagreement actually hampered the execution of Bloc policies?
- E. To what extent does Soviet or Chinese policy show accommodation to pressures by other parties?

III. WHAT ARE THE PROBABLE FUTURE TENDENCIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF CONTROL IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT?

- A. Will the USSR seek to re-establish a greater degree of control, or will it accommodate itself to pressures for greater autonomy and participation in policymaking?

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- B. What effect will China have on Soviet control? Are there any prospects for a separate Chinese-led Bloc?
- C. Will other parties become more or less responsive to Soviet direction? What factors will determine this?
- D. How will these trends affect Bloc foreign policy and Communist prospects for further expansion? What dangers or opportunities will they present to the West?

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